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Abstract 
This article raises concerns about the advantages of using statistical significance tests in research 
assessments as has recently been suggested in the debate about proper normalization procedures for 
citation indicators by Opthof and Leydesdorff (2010).  Statistical significance tests are highly 
controversial and numerous criticisms have been leveled against their use.  Based on examples from 
articles by proponents of the use statistical significance tests in research assessments, we address 
some of the numerous problems with such tests.  The issues specifically discussed are the ritual 
practice of such tests, their dichotomous application in decision making, the difference between 
statistical and substantive significance, the implausibility of most null hypotheses, the crucial 
assumption of randomness, as well as the utility of standard errors and confidence intervals for 
inferential purposes.  We argue that applying statistical significance tests and mechanically 
adhering to their results are highly problematic and detrimental to critical thinking.  We claim that 
the use of such tests do not provide any advantages in relation to deciding whether differences 
between citation indicators are important or not.  On the contrary their use may be harmful.  Like 
many other critics, we generally believe that statistical significance tests are over- and misused in 
the empirical sciences including scientometrics and we encourage a reform on these matters.   
Highlights:  We warn against the use of statistical significance tests (NHST) in research 
assessments.  We introduce the controversial debate of NHST to the informetric community.  We 
demonstrate some of the numerous flaws, misconceptions and misuses of NHST.  We discuss 
potential alternatives and conclude that no "easy fixes" exist.  We advocate informed judgment, free 
of the NHST-ritual, in decision processes. 
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1.  Introduction 
In a recent article Opthof and Leydesdorff (2010; hereafter O&L) make several claims against the 
validity of journal and field normalization procedures applied in the so called “crown indicator” 
developed by the Center for Science and Technology Studies (CWTS) at Leiden University in the 
Netherlands.  Like Lundberg (2007) before them, O&L suggest a normalization procedure based on 
a sum of ratios instead of a ratio of sums as used in the “crown indicator”.  While Lundberg (2007) 
and O&L give different reasons for such a normalization approach, they do commonly argue that it 
is a more sound statistical procedure.  O&L for their part argue that, contrary to the “crown 
indicator”, their proposed normalization procedure, which follows the arithmetic order of 
operations, provides a distribution with statistics that can be applied for statistical significance tests.  
This claim is repeated in Leydesdorff and Opthof (2010), as well as Leydesdorff et al. (2011); 
indeed in all these articles, Leydesdorff and co-authors distinctly indicate that significance tests are 
important, advantageous and somewhat necessary in order to detect “significant” differences 
between the units assessed.   
O&L’s critique and proposals are interesting and they have raised a heated but needed debate 
in the community (e.g., Bornmann, 2010; Moed, 2010; Spaan, 2010; Van Raan et al., 2010; Gingras 
& Larivière, 2011; Larivière & Gingras, 2011; Waltman et al., 2011a).  We are sympathetic to the 
claims that sums of ratios are advantageous, nevertheless, on at least one important point we think 
that O&L’s claims are flawed, and that is the role of statistical significance tests. 
The authors seem to ignore the numerous criticisms raised against statistical significance tests 
throughout various decades in numerous empirical fields within the social, behavioral, medical and 
life sciences, for example in psychology and education (Rozeboom, 1960; Bakan, 1966; Carver, 
1978; Meehl, 1978; 1990; Oakes, 1986; Cohen, 1990; 1994; Gigerenzer, 1993; Schmidt & Hunter, 
1997), sociology (Morrison & Henkel, 1969), economics (McCloskey, 1985; McCloskey & Ziliak, 
1996), clinical medicine and epidemiology (Rothman, 1986; Goodman, 1993; 2008; Stang, Poole & 
Kuss, 2010), as well as statistics proper (Berkson, 1938; Cox et al., 1977; Kruskal, 1978; Guttman, 
1985; Tukey, 1991; Krantz, 1999), and recently Marsh, Jayasinghe and Bond (2011) in this journal, 
to name just a few non-Bayesian critical works out of literally hundreds.  Unawareness of the 
criticisms leveled against significance tests seems to be the standard in many empirical disciplines 
(e.g., Huberty & Pike, 1999).  For many decades the substantial criticisms have been neglected.  A 
fact Roozeboom (1997) has called a “sociology-of-science wonderment” (p. 335).  Only recently, at 
least in some disciplines, e.g., medicine, psychology and ecology, has the criticism slowly begun to 
have an effect on some researchers, journal editors, and in guidelines and textbooks, but the effect is 
still scanty (e.g., Wilkinson et al., 1999; Fidler & Cumming, 2007). 
Statistical significance tests are highly controversial.  They are surrounded by myths.  They are 
overused and are very often misunderstood and misused (for a fine overview, see Kline, 2004).  
Criticisms are numerous.  Some point to the inherently logical flaws in statistical significance tests 
(e.g., Cohen, 1994).  Others claim that such tests have no scientific relevance; in fact they may be 
harmful (e.g., Armstrong, 2007).  Others have documented a whole catalogue of misinterpretations 
of statistical significance tests and especially the p value (e.g., Oakes, 1986; Goodman, 2008).  Still 
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others have documented various different misuses, such as neglecting statistical power, indifference 
to randomness, adherence to a mechanical ritual, arbitrary significance levels forcing dichotomous 
decision making, and implausible nil null hypotheses, to name some (e.g. Gigerenzer, 1993; Shaver, 
1993).  Rothman (1986) exemplifies the critical perspective: 
Testing for statistical significance today continues not on its merits as a methodological tool but on the 
momentum of tradition.  Rather than serving as a thinker’s tool, it has become for some a clumsy 
substitute for thought, subverting what should be a contemplate exercise into an algorithm prone to error 
(p. 445). 
Alternatives and supplements to significance tests have been suggested; among these for example 
effect size estimations and confidence intervals, power analyses, and study replications (e.g., Kirk, 
1996).  Interestingly, relatively few have defended statistical significance tests and those who have, 
agree with many of the criticisms leveled against such tests (e.g., Abelson, 1997; Cortina & Dunlap, 
1997; Chow, 1998; Wainer, 1999).  The defenders do however claim that most of these failings are 
due to humans and that significance tests can play a role, albeit a limited one, in research.  Critics 
will have none of this, as history testifies that the so-called limited role is not practicable, people 
continue to overuse, misunderstand and misuse such tests.  To critics, statistical significance tests 
have let the social sciences astray and scientific research can and should live without them (e.g., 
Carver, 1978; Armstrong, 2007).  
The aim of the present article is to warn against what Gigerenzer (2004) calls “mindless statistics” 
and the “null ritual”.  We argue that applying statistical significance tests and mechanically 
adhering to their results in research and more specifically in research assessments, as suggested by 
O&L, is highly problematic and detrimental to critical (scientific) thinking.  We claim that the use 
of such tests do not provide any advantages in relation to deciding whether differences between 
citation indicators are important or not.  On the contrary their use may be harmful.  Like many other 
critics, we generally believe that statistical significance tests are so problematic that reform is 
urgently needed (see for example, Cumming, 2012).  
Centered on examples mainly from O&L (Opthof & Leydesdorff, 2010), we address some of 
the numerous problems of such tests.  It is important to emphasize that the fallacies we discuss here 
are extremely common in the social sciences and not distinctive for the particular article by O&L 
we scrutinize.  To emphasize this we provide further brief examples haphazardly retrieved from the 
recent scientometric literature.  The reason we specifically respond to O&L's article is a grave 
concern that such a flawed “ritual” should be used in relation to the already sensitive issue of 
research assessment based on citation indicators, as well as a reaction to the argument that such 
tests are supposed to be advantageous in that respect.  But this article is not an exhaustive review of 
all problems and criticisms leveled at statistical significance tests; we simple do not have the space 
for that and several such reviews already exist (e.g., Oakes, 1986; Nickerson, 2000; Kline, 2004).  
Thus we only address some of the problems and controversies due to their appearance in the article 
by O&L.  They do not come in any natural order and are intrinsically related.  We have organized 
the article according to the problems addressed.  First we outline our understanding of how O&L 
approach significance tests in their article.  In the second section, we proceed with some of the 
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caveats related to the use of statistical significance tests.  We outline the practice of significance 
tests, and we discuss some of the misconceptions and misuses, including the assumption of 
randomness and the utility of standard errors and confidence intervals.  We conclude with a 
summary and some recommendations for best practice, to inspiration for authors, reviewers and 
editors. 
2.  The conception and application of significance tests in the article by O&L 
In this section we outline how O&L employ significance tests in their article, and how they 
seemingly consider “significance” and present their arguments for the supposed advantages of such 
tests.  Notice, O&L's reasoning based upon statistical significance tests have briefly been criticized 
in Waltman et al. (2011b).  In the present article we elaborate on these matters. 
O&L state that if we average over the aggregate then we can “test for the significance of the 
deviation of the test set from the reference set” (2010, p. 424).  O&L thus claim that the 
normalization procedure they suggest (i.e. sum of ratios) enable statistical significance testing and 
that the latter can decide whether citation scores deviate “significantly” from the baseline.  
According to O&L this is a clear advantage, and we assume that they consider this process 
somewhat objective.   In order to compare their normalization procedure to that of CWTS, and to 
demonstrate the claimed advantages of significance tests, O&L produce a number of empirical 
examples combined with test statistics.  Differences in journal normalizations are first explored in a 
smaller data set.  Next a “real-life” data set from the Academic Medical Centre (AMC) in the 
Netherlands is used to compare the relative citation scores for one scientist based on the two 
different normalization procedures, and subsequently to compare the effects of the different 
normalizations on values and ranks for 232 scholars at AMC1
                                                 
1 Using the Academic Medical Centre for the demonstration is interesting since CWTS has produced and delivered 
relative citation indicators in a previous evaluation of the centre. 
.  The AMC data set is further 
explored in Leydesdorff and Opthof (2010a; 2010b).  O&L use p values in connection with Pearson 
and Spearman correlation coefficients, as well as the Kruskal-Wallis test used with Bonferroni 
corrections.  In the latter case the significance level is given as 5%, whereas 1% and 5% are used 
with the correlation statistics.  Also, citation scores based on O&L’s normalization approach come 
with standard errors of the mean in the articles.  It is a central point in O&L’s argument that their 
normalization approach produces a statistic where uncertainty (i.e., random error) can be estimated 
by providing standard errors and the argument goes “[i]f the normalization is performed as 
proposed by us, the score is 0.91 (±0.11) and therewith not significantly different” (p. 426).  This 
quote is exemplary for O&L’s treatment of statistical significance tests and the apparent implicit or 
explicit view upon “significance”.  First, O&L consider the question of “significance” as a 
dichotomous decision, either a result is significant or not.  Second, their rhetoric suggest that 
“significance” implies importance or rather lack of importance in this case, as the “world average” 
citation score of 1 is treated as a point null hypothesis, and since 1 is located within the confidence 
limits they cannot reject the null hypothesis, concluding that there is no “significant difference” 
from the “world average”.  Notice also that O&L use standard errors as a surrogate for tests for 
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significance by determining whether the estimated interval subsumes the “world average” citation 
score or not. 
We claim that the approach to statistical significance testing described above is common 
among social scientist.  Nevertheless, it requires some critical comments because it is deeply 
entangled in the quagmire of problems relating to significance tests and if applied as suggested by 
O&L in research assessments, it may distort the decision making process and have serious 
consequences for those assessed.  The next section addresses some of these problems and 
controversies. 
3.  Some caveats related to statistical significance tests 
In this section we address some important problems in relation to statistical significance tests on the 
basis of practice, arguments and claims in O&L.  First we briefly discuss what statistical 
significance tests are and outline their ritualistic practice.  Second we define effect size and 
statistical power.  Subsequently we address some common misinterpretations of statistical 
significance tests, and closely related to this, we discuss the mechanical dichotomous decision 
process that significance tests usually lead to.  The following subsection discusses some misuses of 
statistical significance test, especially the implausibility of most nil null hypotheses.  This leads to a 
discussion of one of the crucial assumptions behind such tests, randomness; and finally, we address 
the issue of standard errors and confidence intervals and their supposed advantages compared to p 
values. 
3.1  The purpose and practice of statistical significance test  
The dominant approach to statistical significance testing is an unusual hybrid of two fundamentally 
different frequentist approaches to statistical inference, Ronald. A. Fisher’s “inductive inference” 
and Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson’s “inductive behavior” (Gigerenzer et al., 1989).  According 
to Gigerenzer (2004, p.588), most hybrid significance tests are performed as a “null ritual”, where: 
• A statistical null hypothesis of “no difference” or “zero correlation” in the population is set 
up, sometimes called a nil null hypothesis.  Predictions of the research hypothesis or any 
alternative substantive hypotheses are not specified.  Notice, other hypotheses to be 
nullified, such a directional, non-zero or interval estimates, are possible but seldom used, 
hence the “null ritual”. 
• An arbitrary but conventional 5% significance level (or lower) is used for rejecting the null 
hypothesis.  If the result is “significant” the research hypothesis is accepted.  Results are 
reported as p < .05, p < .01, or p < .001 (whichever comes next to the obtained p value).  
Notice, other significance levels can be used. 
• This procedure is always performed. 
While the “null ritual” has refined aspects, these do not change the essence of the ritual, which is 
identical for all statistical significance tests in the frequentist tradition.  Statistical significance tests 
in this hybrid tradition are also popularly known as null hypothesis significance tests (NHST).  
NHST produces a probability value (p value).  The definition of the p value is as follows:  
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• The probability of the observed data, plus more extreme data across all possible random 
samples, if the null hypothesis is true, given randomness2
The general form can be written as p (Data | H0).  While the mathematical definition of the p value 
is rather simple, its meaning has shown to be very difficult to interpret correctly.  Carver (1978), 
Kline (2004) and Goodman (2008) list many misconceptions about p values.  For example, the 
incorrect interpretation that if p = .05, the null hypothesis has only a 5% chance of being true.  As 
the p value is calculated under the assumption that the null hypothesis is true, it cannot 
simultaneously be a probability that the null hypothesis is false.  We are not to blame for this 
confusion.  Fisher himself could not explain the inferential meaning of his own invention 
(Goodman, 2008).   
 and a sample size of n (i.e., the 
sample size used in the particular study), and all assumptions of the test statistic are satisfied 
(e.g., Goodman, 2008, p. 136).   
The individual elements of the above statement about NHST are very important, though often 
neglected or ignored.  First, it is important to realize that p values are conditional probabilities that 
should be interpreted from an objective frequentist philosophy of probability, i.e., a relative 
frequency “in-the-long-run” perspective (von Mises, 1928).  Because the "long-run" relative 
frequency is a property of all events in the collective3
Second, the p value is a conditional probability of the data based on the assumption that the 
null hypothesis is true in the population, i.e., p (Data | H0), and therefore not the inverse probability 
p (H0 | Data) as often believed (Cohen, 1994).  The theoretical sampling distribution against which 
results are compared (e.g., t, F, χ2 distributions) are generated by assuming that sampling occurs 
from a population(s) in which the null hypothesis is exactly true.  Third, randomness is a 
fundamental assumption, it is the raison d'être of NHST.  Without randomness, NHST become 
meaningless as we cannot address sampling error, the sole purpose of such tests (Shaver, 1993).  
Fourth, sample size is a crucial consideration, because the p value is a function of effect and sample 
sizes, as well as spread in data (Cohen, 1990).  Fifth, the result of NHST is a probability statement, 
often expressed as a dichotomy in terms of whether the probability was less or more than the 
significance level (α).  Notice that p values and α levels are two different theoretical entities.  To 
Fisher p values are a property of the data and his notion of probability relating to the study.  To 
Neyman-Pearson α is a fixed property of the test not the data and their conception of error rate in 
, it follows that a probability applies to a 
collective and not a single event (Dienes, 2008).  Neither do probabilities apply to the truth of 
hypotheses as a hypothesis is not a collective.  Consequently, a p value is not a probability of a 
single result; it is a conditional probability “in the long run”.  This can also be inferred from the 
definition above “… the observed data, plus more extreme data across all possible random 
samples”.  More extreme data actually refer to results that have not happened.  Thus, if we repeat 
the study many times by drawing random samples from the same population(s), what would 
happen?  In reality we sample only once and relate the p value to the actual result!   
                                                 
2 We use randomness to include both random sampling and random assignment. 
3 The set of events that an objective probability – understood as a relative long-run frequency – applies to.  Technically, 
the set should be infinite, but this requirement is often relaxed in practice. 
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the "long-run" that strikes a balance between α, β (the probability of making a Type II error), and 
sample size n (Gigerenzer et al., 1989).  The conventional 5% is due to Fisher (1925).  Later, in his 
bitter arguments with Neyman and Pearson, he would discard the conventional level and argue for 
reporting exact p values.   
3.2  Effect Size and statistical power 
In this context, two important concepts should briefly be clarified before we continue, effect size 
and statistical power.  An effect size is a statistic that estimates the magnitude of the result in the 
population (e.g., Kirk, 1996).  Measures of effect size can be classified as standardized or 
unstandardized.  Standardized measures are scale-free because they are defined in terms of the 
variability in the data.  Some well-known standardized measures include Cohen's d, r, R2 and odds 
ratios (e.g., Kirk, 1996; Grissom & Kim, 2005).  Unstandardized measures are expressed in the 
original units or in terms of percentages or proportions.  Effect sizes are important for at least three 
reasons: 1) they provide crucial information for judging the importance of a result; 2) they are 
important for accumulation of evidence over time and thus for meta-analysis and theory building; 
and 3) prior to a study, estimates of anticipated effect sizes can be used in power analyses to project 
adequate sample size for detecting statistically significant results (e.g., Kirk, 1996; Kline, 2004, 
Ellis, 2010).   
The statistical power of a significance tests is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis 
when it is false (Cohen, 1988).  Power is the complement of β (1 - β).  A statistical power analysis 
involves four variables: significance level (α), sample size (n), effect size and power.  For any 
statistical model, these relationships are such that each is a function of the other three.  Statistical 
power is affected chiefly by the size of the effect and the size of the sample used to detect it (Cohen, 
1988; 1990).  Bigger effects are easier to detect than smaller effects, while large samples offer 
greater test sensitivity than small samples.  Given α and the anticipated effect size, we can 
determine the sample size needed for detecting a statistically significant effect with a certain 
likelihood (i.e. power) when there is an effect there to be detected.  Statistical power is particularly 
important when there is a true difference or association in the population.  The test must be 
powerful enough to detect such differences or associations.  Otherwise, a non-significant result 
would simply mean that a Type II error has been committed.   
3.3  Some common misinterpretations of statistical significance tests 
Despite frequent warnings in the literature, statistical significance is too often conflated with the 
practical or theoretical importance of empirical results.  In a recent survey of management research, 
Seth et al. (2009, p. 7-8) found that 90% of the papers did not distinguished between statistical 
significance and practical importance.  Statistical significance is often used as the sole criterion of 
importance leading to ritualistic dichotomous decision behavior and thereby deemphasizing 
interpretations of effect sizes (e.g., Scarr, 1997).  A clear distinction must be made because 
statistically significant results are not necessarily important.   
Statistical significance leads simply to a conclusion that A is different from B, or, at best, that 
A is greater than B, or that insufficient evidence has been found for a difference.  Typically when 
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we reject a null hypothesis of zero effect we conclude that there is a "significant" effect in the 
population.  When we fail to reject we conclude that there is no effect.  Many critics argue, 
however, that such mere binary decisions provide an impoverished view of what science seeks or 
can achieve.  Kirk asks “[h]ow far would physics have progressed if their researches had focused on 
discovering ordinal relationships?” (1996, p. 754).  What we appear to forget, however, is that 
statistical significance is a function of sample size and the magnitude of the actual effect (e.g., 
Rosenthal, 1994, p. 232).  Large effect size and small sample size as well as small effect size and 
large sample size can both bring about statistical significance with matching p values, but more 
disturbingly, such "significant effects" are most often treated the same way.  Effect and sample 
sizes are rarely considered, but they should.  Consider the following example from Schubert and 
Glänzel (1983) who suggest the w statistic as a statistical significance test for differences between 
journal impact factors (JIF).  In their example they compare two journals with impact factors 0.611 
and 0.913.  The w statistic of 1.98 is larger than 1.96, the value corresponding to the 5% 
significance level, hence the authors conclude that "... the impact factors of the two journals differ 
significantly ..." (Schubert & Glänzel, 1983, p. 65).  The important question, however, is whether 
this difference is important?  Informed human judgment is needed for such a decision.  "Human 
judgment" refers to the fact that decision-making in statistical inference is basically subjective, 
context depended and goal oriented (e.g., Bakan, 1966; Carver, 1978; Tukey, 1991).  "Informed" 
refers to the fundamental premise of providing a sound basis upon which one can make a decision 
about importance.  In that respect, we need to focus on effect sizes and confidence intervals, 
consider the research design, and perhaps most important, relate the result to former empirical 
findings and theoretical insights (e.g., Kirk, 1996).  But when it comes to research assessments, 
such an intellectual base is virtually absent.  It is a fundamental problem in relation to the 
application of statistical significance tests for comparison between citation indicators in research 
assessments that we basically do not know a priori what differences would be important.  
Obviously importance depends on context and goal of the assessment, as well as costs and benefits.  
But we do not have a substantial empirical and theoretical literature that can guide us with some 
anticipatory effect sizes to look for.  Thus, in this example, for lack of anything better, we judge the 
standardized effect size in relation to Cohen's benchmarks for "small", "medium" and "large" effect 
sizes (Cohen, 1988).  Cohen reluctantly proposed his benchmarks for statistical power analyses to 
help researchers guess on effect size when no other sources for estimation exist.  Using his 
conventional definitions to interpret observed effect sizes in general is problematic and could easily 
lead to yet another form for "mindless" statistics.  Cohen himself urged to interpret effect sizes 
based on the context of the data and his benchmarks should be seen as a last resort.  Returning to 
the JIF example above, Cohen's d, a standardized mean difference effect size, yield an effect size 
around .24.  According to Cohen (1988), "small" effect sizes begin around .20 for mean differences.  
Effect sizes lower than this are considered trivial and the benchmark for "medium-sized" effects is 
set to .50.  Is the apparently "small" but statistically significant effect between the two journal 
impact factors important?  The confidence interval for the effect size is -.01 to .48, which is from 
zero effect to almost a medium effect, can we base our decision on this level of uncertainty?  
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Important effect sizes, those we determine would make a difference, and accepted levels of 
uncertainty, should be defined before the study commences.  But beware, big effects are not 
necessarily important effects, neither are small effects necessarily unimportant.  Now the question 
of course is "how big is big?"  Obviously the question is relative to the actual study and certainly 
not easy to answer.  A relative citation impact of 1.05 can be "statistically significant" above the 
world average of 1, but we would probably not consider this result important or rather it depends on 
the context.  
3.4  Misuse of the term "significance" and the practice of dichotomous decisions 
One of the reasons for the widespread use of the null ritual may well be the false belief that 
statistical significance tests can decide for us whether results are important or not.  By relying on 
the ritual we are conveniently relived of further pains of hard thinking about differences that make a 
difference (Gigerenzer, 2004).  An overwhelming number of tests are produced in this mechanical 
fashion.  But the truth is that most of them do not scrutinize the statistically significant differences 
found and it is likely that most differences are trivial despite the implied rhetoric (e.g., Webster & 
Starbuck, 1988).  The rhetorical practice is often to drop the qualifier “statistical” and speak instead 
of “significant differences”.  Using the term “significance” without the qualifier certainly gives an 
impression of importance, but “significance” in its statistical sense means something quite different.  
It has a very limited interpretation specifically related to sampling error.  Reporting that a result is 
"highly significant" simply means a "long-run" interpretation of how strong the data, or more 
extreme data, contradict the null hypothesis that the effect is zero in the population, given repeated 
random sampling with the same sample size.  Whether the result is "highly important" is another 
question still not answered.   
Nowhere in their articles do O&L use the qualifier “statistical”.  They continuously speak of 
“significance”, “significantly different” or “not significantly different”.  For example, they 
emphasize that such a procedure (sum of ratios) “…allows us to test for significance of the 
deviation of the test set from the reference set” (2010, p. 424), or “… the researcher under study 
would show as performing significantly below the world average in his reference group, both with 
(0.71) or without self-citations (0.58)” (2010, p. 426).  To us at least, it seems evident that 
“significance” to O&L somehow is conceived of as a criterion of importance and used as a 
dichotomous decision making tool in relation to research assessment, i.e., either the results are 
“significant” or not.  There are countless examples in the scientometric literature of similar practice, 
where statistical significance is treated as the binary criterion for importance of results.  For 
example in regression analysis, the importance of predictor variables or the fit of the model usually 
comes down to whether t or F statistics are "significant" or not at the conventional alpha levels 
(e.g., Stremersch, Verniers & Verhoef, 2007; Haslam et al., 2008 and Mingers & Xu, 2010 to name 
just a few studies that try to identify variables that predict citation impact).   
Now it may be that O&L do in fact mean “statistical significance” in its limited frequentist 
sense relating to sampling error, which this quote could indicate “[t]he significance of differences 
depends on the shape of the underlying distributions and the size of the samples” (2010, p. 428); but 
if so, they explicitly fail to attend to it in a proper and unambiguous manner.  And this merely raises 
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new concerns, such as the plausibility of the null hypothesis, the assumption of randomness and the 
actual statistical power involved.  We will address these questions in the following subsections.   
Dichotomous decisions based on arbitrary significance levels are uninformed.  Consider Table 
1 in Leydesdorff & Opthof (2010a, p. 645), were the Spearman rank correlation between field 
normalized sum of ratios versus ratio of sums is not significant in this particular study (we assume 
at the 5% level).  A calculation of the exact p value, with n = 7, gives a probability of .052.  To 
quote Rosnow and Rosentahl, “surely, God loves the .06 nearly as much as the .05” (1989, p. 1277).  
A rhetorical variant of this example is found in the following quote from Jacob, Lehrl and Henkel 
(2007, p. 125) "... citation rates in co-authorships almost reach significance (p = 0.059) pointing to a 
trend to support this assumption".  Surely, the practical difference between .049 and .059 is 
miniscule but the quote also reveals a very common and serious misunderstanding, the so-called 
"inverse probability fallacy" (e.g., Carver, 1978).  The p value provides no direct information about 
the truth or falsity of the null hypothesis, conditional or otherwise.  To recapture, NHST provides 
the p(Data | H0) and not p(H0 | Data).  The latter however is usually what researchers want to know.  
According to Cohen "[NHST] does not tell us what we want to know, and we so much want to 
know what we want to know that, out of desperation, we nevertheless believe that it does!  What we 
want to know is 'Given these data, what is the probability that H0 is true?'  But as most of us know, 
what it tells us is 'Given that H0 is true, what is the probability of these (or more extreme) data?" 
(p.997).  We think it is unsophisticated to treat the “truth” as a clear-cut binary variable and ironic 
that a decision that makes no allowance for uncertainty occurs in a domain that purports to describe 
degrees of uncertainty.  Remember also that frequentists are concerned with collectives not the truth 
of a single event.  The ritualistic use of the arbitrary 5% or 1% levels induces researchers to neglect 
critical examination of the relevance and importance of the findings.  Researchers must always 
report not merely statistical significance but also the actual statistics and reflect upon the practical 
or theoretical importance of the results.  This is also true for citation indicators and differences in 
performance rankings.  To become more quantitative, precise, and theoretically rich, we need to 
move beyond dichotomous decision making. 
3.5  The misuse of nil null hypotheses and the neglect of Type II errors 
Significance tests are computed based on the assumption that the null hypothesis is true in the 
population.  This is hardly ever the fact in the social sciences.  Nil null hypotheses are almost 
always implausible, at least in observational studies (e.g., Berkson, 1938; Lykken, 1968; Meehl, 
1978; Cohen, 1990, Anderson et al., 2000).  A nil null hypothesis is one which posits, in an absolute 
sense, no difference or no association in a parameter, and it is almost universally applied (Cohen, 
1994).  There will always be uncontrolled spurious factors in observational studies and it is even 
questionable whether randomization can be expected to exactly balance out the effects of all 
extraneous factors in experiments (Meehl, 1978).  As a result, the observed correlation between any 
two variables or the difference between any two means will seldom be exactly 0.0000 to the nth 
decimal.  A null hypothesis of no difference is therefore most probably implausible, and if so, 
disproving it is both unimpressive and uninformative (Lykken, 1968; Cohen, 1994).  Add to this the 
sample size sensitivity of NHST (e.g., Cohen, 1990; Mayo, 2006).  For example, an observed effect 
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of r = .25 is statistically significant if n = 63 but not if n = 61 in a two-tailed test.  A large enough 
sample can reject any nil null hypotheses.  This property of NHST follows directly from the fact 
that a nil null hypothesis defines an infinitesimal point on a continuum.  As the sample size 
increases, the confidence interval shrinks and become less and less likely to include the point 
corresponding to the null hypothesis.  Given a large enough sample size, many relationships can 
emerge as being statistically significant because “everything correlates to some extent with 
everything else” (Meehl, 1990, p. 204).”  These correlations exist for a combination of interesting 
and trivial reasons.  Meehl (1990) referred to the tendency to reject null hypotheses when the true 
relationships are trivial as the “crud factor”.  And Tukey (1991) piercingly wrote that "… it is 
foolish to ask ’are the effects of A and B different?’  They are always different - for some decimal 
place" (p. 100).  What we want to know is the size of the difference between A and B and the error 
associated with our estimate.  Consequently, a difference of trivial effect size or even a totally 
spurious one will eventually be statistically significant in an overpowered study.  Similarly, 
important differences can fail to reach statistical significance in poorly designed, underpowered 
studies.  Notice, that it is a fallacy to treat a statistically non-significant result as having no 
difference or no effect.  For example, O&L (2010, p. 426) state that “[i]f the normalization is 
performed as proposed by us, the score is 0.91 (±0.11) and therewith not significantly different from 
the world average”.  Without considering statistical power and effect sizes, statistically non-
significant results are virtually uninterpretable.   
Consider another example.  In a study on determinants of faculty research productivity, Long 
et al. (2009, p. 245) conclude that they cannot support their research hypothesis that doctoral 
students in information systems with high-status academic origins exhibit greater research 
productivity in terms of both quantity and quality than doctoral graduates with moderate- or low 
status academic origins.  An F test indicated that differences in mean citation counts across 
academic origins (i.e. 108.82, 95.26 and 37.08 respectively) were not statistically significant (p = 
.09).  Likewise, no "significant pairwise differences" were found.  But p = .09 does not mean that 
the assumption of equality between mean citation counts exist.  It does mean that the data were not 
inconsistent with the assumed nil null statistical hypothesis at the conventional 5% alpha level, 
given the actual sample size.  Again we see the misconception p(H0 | Data).  Though often 
emphasized that failing to reject the null hypothesis does not mean that the null hypothesis is true, 
when it comes to a decision this is a distinction without a difference.  The practical consequence is 
that we act as if there was no difference in citation counts between high-status, moderate-status and 
low-status graduates.  We suspect that similar differences in mean citation counts at p = .05 would 
have lead the authors to a supportive conclusion.  But perhaps the nil null hypothesis was 
implausible to begin with?  As in the previous example, considerations of power and effect sizes are 
also needed in this case in order to say anything concerning the research hypothesis.   
It is important to note that Type I errors can only occur when the null hypothesis is actually 
true.  The p value only exists assuming the null hypothesis to be true.  Accordingly, with 
implausible null hypotheses, the effective rate of Type I errors in many studies may essentially be 
zero and the only kind of decision errors are Type II.  If the nil null hypothesis is unlikely to be true, 
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testing it is unlikely to advance our knowledge.  It is more realistic to assume non-zero population 
associations or differences, but we seldom do that in our statistical hypotheses.  In fact we seldom 
reflect upon the plausibility of our null hypotheses, or for that matter adequately address other 
underlying assumptions associated with NHST (e.g., Keselman et al., 1998).  O&L do not reflect 
upon the plausibility of their various unstated nil null hypotheses.  As far as we understand O&L, 
they apply Kruskal-Wallis tests in order to decide whether the citation scores of their AMC 
researchers are “significantly different” from unity (the world average of 1).  Is the null hypothesis 
of exactly no difference to the nth decimal in the population plausible and in a technical sense true?  
We question that.  Surely citation scores deviate from 1 at some level of precision (e.g., Berkson, 
1942).  Sample sizes in O&L are generally small.  In the particular case of AMC researchers #117 
and #118 (p. 427), their citation scores of 1.50 and .93 turns out to be not "significantly different" 
from the world average of 1.  But the results are a consequence of low statistical power, i.e., small 
sample sizes combined with Bonferroni procedures, and we are more likely dealing with a Type II 
error, a failure to reject a false null hypothesis of no absolute difference.  If sample sizes could be 
enlarged randomly, then the statistical power of the studies would be strengthened.  However, if the 
null hypothesis is false anyway, then it is just a question of finding a sufficiently large sample to 
reject the null hypothesis.  Sooner or later the citation scores of AMC researchers #117 and #118 
will be "significantly different" from the world average.  The question of course is whether such a 
deviation is trivial or important?  Informed human judgment is needed for such decisions.   
Whether the actual AMC samples are probability samples and whether they could be enlarged 
randomly is a delicate question which we return to in section 3.7.  But consider this, if the samples 
are not probability samples addressing sampling error becomes meaningless, and the samples 
should be considered as convenience samples or apparent populations.  In both cases, NHST would 
be irrelevant and the citation scores as they are would do, for example 1.50 and .93.  Are these 
deviations from 1 trivial or important?  Again, we are left with informed human judgment for such 
decisions.   
3.6  Overpowered studies 
Larivière and Gingras (2011) is generally supportive of O&L, but contrary to O&L, their analyses 
of the differences between the two normalization approaches are for most of them overpowered 
with very low p values.  Wilcoxon-signed rank tests are used to decide whether the distributions are 
“statistically different” (p. 395).  Like O&L, Larivière and Gingras (2011) do not reflect upon the 
assumptions associated with NHST, such as randomness or the plausibility of their null hypotheses.  
It is indeed questionable whether these crucial assumptions are met.  A null hypothesis of a 
common median equal to zero is questionable and a (plausible) stochastic data generation 
mechanism is not presented.  Not surprisingly, given the sample sizes involved, the differences 
between the two distributions are “statistically different” or “significantly different” in the words of 
Larivière & Gingras (2011, p. 395).  The more interesting question is to what extent the results are 
important or, conversely, an example of the "crud factor".  Wilcoxon-signed rank tests alone cannot 
tell us whether the differences between the two distributions are noteworthy, especially not in high-
powered studies with implausible nil null hypothesis.  More information is needed.  Larivière and 
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Gingras (2011) do in fact address the importance for some of their results with information extrinsic 
from the Wilcoxon-signed rank tests.  Scores for the sum of ratios, for example, seem to be 
generally higher than those of the ratio of sums, and the authors reflect upon some of the potential 
consequences of these findings (p. 395).  This is commendable.  Again effect sizes and informed 
human judgment are needed for such inferential purposes, and it seems that Larivière and Gingras 
(2011) indeed use differences in descriptive statistics to address the importance of the results.  Why 
then use Wilcoxon-signed rank tests?  As a mechanical ritual that can decide upon importance?  As 
argued this is untenable.  Or as an inferential tool?  In that case we should focus upon the 
assumption of randomness and whether this is satisfied.  This is questionable.  As always, sufficient 
power guarantees falsification of implausible null hypothesis, and this seems to be the case in 
Larivière and Gingras (2011).  Interestingly, prior to Larivière and Gingras (2011), Waltman et al. 
(2011c), obtained similar empirical results comparing the two normalization approaches, albeit 
without involving the null ritual. 
3.7  The assumption of randomness and its potential misuse 
Statistical significance tests concern sampling error and we sample in order to make statistical 
inferences, either descriptive inferences from sample to population or causal claims (Greenland, 
1990).  Statistical inference relies on probability theory.  In order for probability theory and 
statistical tests to work randomness is required (e.g., Cox, 2006).  This is a mathematical necessity 
as standard errors and p values are estimated in distributions that assume random sampling from 
well-defined populations (Berk & Freedman, 2003).  Information on how data is generated becomes 
critical when we go beyond description.  In other words, when we make statistical inferences we 
assume that data are generated by a stochastic mechanism and/or that data are assigned to 
treatments randomly.  The empirical world has a structure that typically negates the possibility of 
random selection unless random sampling is imposed.  Ideally, random sampling ensures that 
sample units are selected independently and with a known nonzero chance of being selected 
(Shaver, 1993).  As a consequence, random samples should come from well-defined finite 
populations, not "imaginary" or "super-populations" (Berk & Freedman, 2003).  With random 
sampling an important empirical matter is resolved.  Without random sampling, we must legitimate 
that the nature or the social world produced the equivalent of a random sample or constructed the 
data in a manner that can be accurately represented by a convenient and well-understood model.  
Redner (2005), for example, suggest that citation data have a stochastic nature generated by a linear 
preferential attachment mechanism.  Perhaps, but we are skeptical about treating social processes as 
genuine stochastic processes that generates the equivalent of random samples like, for example, a 
model of radioactive decay does in the physical world (Berk, Western & Weiss, 1995a).  The social 
world is the domain of man-made laws, social regulations, customs, the particulars of a specific 
culture and the spontaneous actions of people (Winkler, 2009, p. 190-104).  Also, there seems to be 
some debate in our community as to what theoretical distribution that best approximates a citation 
distribution (e.g., Viera & Gomes, 2010).  We believe that randomness is best obtained through an 
appropriate probability sample with a well-defined population.  Alternatively, data may constitute a 
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convenience sample or an apparent population (or a census from a population) (Berk, Western & 
Weiss, 1995a).   
3.7.1  Convenience samples, apparent populations and "super-populations" 
Very few observational studies using inferential statistics in the social sciences clarify how data are 
generated, what chance mechanism is assumed, if any, or define the population to which results are 
generalized, whether explicitly or implicitly.  Presumably, most observational studies, also in our 
field, are based on convenience and not probability samples (Kline, 2004).  Albeit many social 
scientists do it, it is nevertheless a category mistake to make statistical inferences based upon 
samples of convenience.  With convenience samples, bias is to be expected and independence 
becomes problematic (Copas & Li, 1997).  When independence is lacking conventional estimation 
procedures will likely provide incorrect standard errors and p values can be grossly misleading.  
Berk and Freedman (2003) suggest that standard errors and p values will be too small, and that 
many research results are held to be statistically significant when they are the mere product of 
chance variation.  Indeed, there really is no point in addressing sampling error when there is no 
random mechanism to ensure that the probability and mathematical theory behind the calibration is 
working consistently.   
Turning to O&L, it is not at all clear in what way they assume that their samples are a product 
of a chance mechanism and from what well-defined populations they may have been drawn?  For 
example, one of the cases studied in O&L concern one principal investigator (PI) from AMC.  
Sampling units are 65 publications affiliated with the PI for the period 1997-2006.  The questions 
are: (a) in what sense does this data set comprise a probability sample?; and (b) how is the 
population defined?  We assume that O&L have tried to identify all eligible publications in the 
database for the PI in question for the given period.  Most likely, data constitutes all the available 
observations from the "apparent" population of publications affiliated with the PI.  If so, frequentist 
inference based on a long-run interpretation of some repeatable data mechanism is not appropriate.  
There is no uncertainty due to variation in repeated sampling from the population.  A counter 
argument could be that "the data are just one of many possible data sets that could have been 
generated if the PI's career were to be replayed many times over".  But this does not clarify what 
sampling mechanism selected the career we happened to observe.  No one knows, or can know.  It 
is simply not relevant for the problem at hand to think of observations as draws from a random 
process when further realizations are impossible in practice and lack meaning even as abstract 
propositions.  Adhering to a frequentist conception of probability in the face of non-repeatable data 
and in a non-stochastic setting seems dubious.   
Neither can the set of publications identified by O&L in the specific citation database be 
considered a random draw from the finite population of all papers affiliated with the PI, including 
those external to the database.  It is unlikely that the data generation mechanism can be stochastic 
when governed by indexing policies in one database.  Most likely, the data set constitutes a 
convenience sample of specific publication types coincidentally indexed in the specific database.  
Convenience samples are often treated as if they were a random realization from some large, 
poorly-defined population.  This unsupported assumption is sometimes called the “super-population 
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model” (Cochran, 1953).  While some authors argue that "super-populations" are justifiable for 
statistical significance test (e.g., Bollen, 1995), we do not find such arguments convincing for 
frequentist statistics with non-experimental data (see for example, Western and Jackman (1994) and 
Berk, Western and Weiss (1995a; 1995b) for similar views).  "Super-populations" are defined in a 
circular way as the population from which the data would have come if the data were a random 
sample (Berk & Freedman, 2003).  "Super-populations" are imaginary with no empirical existence, 
as a consequence, they do not generate real statistics and inferences to them do not directly answer 
any empirical questions.  What draw from an "imaginary super-population" does the real-world 
sample we have in hand represent?  We simply cannot know.  Inferences to imaginary populations 
are also imaginary (Berk & Freedman, 2003)4
One could of course treat data as an apparent population.  In this non-stochastic setting 
statistical inference is unnecessary because all the available information is collected.  Nonetheless, 
we often still produce standard errors and significance tests for such settings, but their contextual 
meaning is obscure.  There is no sampling error, means and variances are population parameters.  
Notice, population parameters can still be inaccurate due to measurement error, an issue seldom 
discussed in relation to citation indicators.  Leaving measurement error aside for a moment, what 
we are left with is the citation indicator, the actual parameter, what used to be the estimated statistic.  
In the AMC case the indicator for the PI is .91which is below the world average of one.  Is it an 
important deviation from the world average - maybe not?   
.   
It is somehow absurd to address standard errors, p values and confidence intervals with strict 
adherence as if these numbers and intervals were precise, when they are not.  Consider the 
bibliometric data used for indicator calculations.  They are selective, packed with potential errors 
that influence amongst other things the matching process of citing-cited documents (Moed, 2002).  
Obviously, the best possible data should be used, but this actually means that a high workload 
should be invested to improve bibliometric data quality.  It is more than likely that the 
measurements that go into indicators are biased or at least not "precise" (see Adler, Ewing and 
Taylor (2009) for a critical review of citation data and the statistics derived from them).  
Notwithstanding the basic violation of assumptions, we think it is questionable to put so must trust 
in significance tests with sharp margins of failure when our data and measurements most likely at 
best are imprecise.  In practice sampling is complicated and because even well-designed probability 
samples are usually implemented imperfectly, the usefulness of statistical inference will usually be 
a matter of degree.  Nevertheless, this is rarely reflected upon.  In practice sampling assumptions 
are most often left unconsidered.  We believe that the reason why the assumption of randomness is 
often ignored is the widespread and indiscriminate misuse of statistical significance tests which may 
have created a cognitive illusion where assumptions behind such tests have "elapsed" from our 
                                                 
4 Notice, there is an important difference between imaginary populations that plausibly could exist and those that could 
not.  An imaginary population is produced by some real and well-defined stochastic process.  The conditioning 
circumstances and stochastic processes are clearly articulated often in mathematical terms.  In the natural sciences such 
imaginary populations are common.  This is not the case in the social sciences, yet super-populations are very often 
assumed, but seldom justified. 
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minds and their results are thought to be something they are not, namely decision statements about 
the importance of the findings.  One can always make inferences but statistical inferences come 
with restrictive assumptions and frequentist inference is not applicable in non-stochastic settings. 
3.8  Standard errors and confidence intervals permit, but do not guarantee, better inference 
It is generally accepted among critics of statistical significance tests that interval estimates such as 
standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals (CI) are superior to p values and should replace them 
as a means of describing variability in estimators.  If used properly, SE and CI are certainly more 
informative than p values and should replace them.  They focus on uncertainty and interval 
estimation and simultaneously provide an idea of the likely direction and magnitude of the 
underlying difference and the random variability of the point estimate (e.g., Cumming, Fidler & 
Vaux, 2007; Coulson et al., 2010).  But as inferential tools, they are bound to the same frequentist 
theory of probability, meaning “in-the-long-run" interpretations, and riddled with assumptions such 
as randomness and a "correct" statistical model used to construct the limits.  A CI derived from a 
valid test will, over unlimited repetitions of the study, contain the true parameter with a frequency 
no less than its confidence level.  This definition specifies the coverage property of the method used 
to generate the interval, not the probability that the true parameter value lies within the interval, it 
either does or does not.  Thus, frequentist inference makes only pre-sample probability assertions.  
A 95% CI contains the true parameter value with probability .95 only before one has seen the data.  
After the data has been seen, the probability is zero or one.  Yet CIs are universally interpreted in 
practice as guides to post-sample uncertainty.  As Abelson puts it: “[u]nder the Law of the 
Diffusion of Idiocy, every foolish application of significance testing is sooner or later going to be 
translated into a corresponding foolish practice for confidence limits” (1997, p. 130).  When a SE or 
CI is only used to check whether the interval subsumes the point null hypothesis, the procedure is 
no different from checking whether a test statistic is statistically significant or not.  It is a covertly 
NHST.  
O&L provide SE for the citation indicators in their study.  These roughly correspond to 68% 
CI5
In the case of O&L, what seems at first to be a more informative analysis with interval 
estimates turns out to be a genuine significance test with dichotomous decision behavior and 
questionable fulfillment of crucial assumptions.  SEs are used as a surrogate for NHST: “[i]f the 
.  Thus, in a perfect world, the interpretation should be that under repeated realizations, the 
interval would cover the true citation score 68% of the time.  But we have no way of knowing 
whether the current interval is one of the fortunate 68%, and we probably have no possibility for 
further replications.  In addition, as pointed out in the previous section, it is indeed questionable 
whether the samples in O&L are genuine probability samples.  If they are not, interpretation of SE 
becomes confused.  According to Freedman (2003), "an SE for a convenience sample is best viewed 
as a de minimis error estimate: if this were—contrary to fact—a simple random sample, the 
uncertainty due to randomness would be something like the SE".   
                                                 
5 A CI of 95% is roughly 2 SE.  SE bars around point estimates that represent means in graphs are typically one SE 
wide, which corresponds roughly to a 32% significance level and a 68% CI.   
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normalization is performed as proposed by us, the score is 0.91 (±0.11) and therewith not 
significantly different from the world average” (p. 426).  We can see from this quote, and others, 
that their main interest is to check whether the interval subsumes the world average of 1.  In this 
case, it does, and consequently the implicit nil null hypothesis is not rejected.  This is the null ritual 
and it is highly problematic. 
4.  Summary and recommendations 
Opthof and Leydesdorf (2010) provide at least one sound reason for altering the normalization 
procedures in relation to citation indicators, however, it is certainly not statistical significance 
testing.  As we have discussed in the present article, statistical significance tests are highly 
problematic.  They are logically flawed, misunderstood, ritualistically misused, and foremost 
mechanically overused.  They only address sampling error, not necessarily the most important issue.  
They should be interpreted from a frequentist theory of probability and their use is conditional on 
restrictive assumptions, most pertinent, that the null hypothesis must be true and data generation is 
the result of a plausible stochastic process.  These assumptions are seldom met rendering such tests 
virtually meaningless.  The problems sketched here are well known.  Criticisms and 
disenchantments are mounting, but changing mentality and practice in the social sciences is a slow 
affair, given the evidence, indeed a “sociology-of-science wonderment” as Roozeboom (1997, p. 
335) phrased it. 
The use of significance tests by O&L is probably within "normal science" and their practice is 
not necessarily more inferior to those of most others, the other examples testify to that.  What has 
caused our response in this article is a grave ethical concern about the ritualistic use of statistical 
significance testing in connection with research assessments.  Assessments and their byproducts, 
funding, promotion, hiring or sacking, should not be based on a mechanical tool known to be deeply 
controversial.  Whether differences in rankings or impact factors between units, are important 
should be based on human judgment informed by numbers not by mechanical decisions based on 
tests that are logically flawed and very seldom based on the assumptions they are supposed to.  
Indeed, in their argument for changing the normalization procedures, O&L point to, what they see 
as flawed assessments and the real consequences they have had for individual researchers at AMC.  
This is laudable, but then arguing that statistical significance tests is an advancement for such 
assessments are problematic in our view.  As we have argued, it hardly brings more objectivity or 
fairness to research assessments, on the contrary. 
Suggested alternatives to significance tests include the use of CIs and SEs.  They do provide 
more information and are superior to statistical significance tests and should as such be preferred.  
But neither CIs or SEs are a panacea for the problems outlined in this article.  They are based on the 
same frequentist foundation as NHST   
Resampling techniques (e.g., bootstrap, jackknife and randomization) are considered by some 
to be a suitable alternative to statistical significance tests (Diacronis & Efron, 1983).  Resampling 
techniques are basically internal replications that recombine the observations in a data set in 
different ways to estimate precision, often with fewer assumptions about underlying population 
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distributions compared to traditional methods (Lunneborg, 2000).  Resampling techniques are 
versatile and certainly have merits.  The bootstrap technique seems especially well suited for 
interval estimation if we are unwilling or unable to make a lot of assumptions about population 
distributions.  A potential application in this area is the estimation of CIs for effect sizes and for 
sensitivity analyses (e.g., Colliander & Ahlgren, 2011).  In the 2011 Leiden Ranking by CWTS, 
such interval estimations seem to have been implemented in the form of "stability intervals" for the 
various indicators.  Notice, they are used for uncertainty estimation, not statistical inference.  
Indeed, the statistical inferential capabilities of resampling techniques are highly questionable.  
Basically, one is simulating the frequentist "in-the-long-run" interpretation but using only the data 
set on hand as if it were the population.  If this data set is small, unrepresentative, biased, non-
random or the observations are not independent, resampling from it will not somehow fix these 
problems.  In fact resampling can magnify the effects of unusual features in a data set.  
Consequently, resampling does not entirely free us from having to make assumptions about the 
population distribution and it is not a substitute for external replication, which is always more 
preferable.   
Other statistical tools that could inform a decision-making process when it comes to 
comparison and importance of results are, for example, exploratory data analyses, such as box-
whiskers plot.  But there are more satisfactory inferential alternatives, which contrary to NHST, do 
assess the degree of support that data provide for hypotheses, e.g., Bayesian inference (e.g., Gelman 
et al., 2004), model-based inference based on information theory (e.g., Anderson, 2008) and 
likelihood inference (e.g., Royall, 1997).   
4.1.  Some recommendations for best practice 
Some researchers have called for a ban on NHST (e.g., Hunter, 1997).  Censoring is not the way 
forward, but neither is status quo.  What we need is statistical reforms as suggested for example by 
Wilkinson et al. (1999), Kline (2004), Cumming (2012).  Here emphasis is on parameter estimation, 
i.e. effect size estimation with confidence intervals.  Important publication guidelines such as APA 
(2010) still sanction the use of NHST, albeit with strong recommendations to report measures of 
effect size and confidence intervals around them (e.g. APA, 2010, p. 34).   
Based on the aforementioned sources on statistical reform, here are some recommendations 
on data analysis practices from the frequentist perspective: 1) statistical inference only makes sense 
when data come from a probability sample or have been randomly assigned to treatment and control 
groups; 2) whenever possible take an estimation framework, starting with the formulation of 
research aims such as “how much?” or “to what extent?”; 3) interpretation of research results 
should be based on point and interval estimates; 4) calculate effect size estimates and confidence 
intervals to answer those questions, then interpret results based on informed judgment; 5) if 
statistical significance tests are used, (a) information on power must be reported, and (b) the null 
hypothesis should be plausible; 6) effect sizes and confidence intervals must be reported whenever 
possible for all effects studied, whether large or small, statistically significant or not; 7) exact p 
values should be reported; 8) it is unacceptable to describe results solely in terms of statistical 
significance; 9) use the word “significant” without the qualifier “statistically” only to describe 
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results that are truly noteworthy; 10) it is the researcher’s responsibility to explain why the results 
have substantive significance; statistical tests are inadequate for this purpose; 11) replication is the 
best way to deal with sampling error.  
Finally, it is important to emphasize what significance tests, or CIs and SEs used for the same 
purpose, are not, and what they cannot do for us.  They do not make a decision for us.  Standard 
limits for retaining or rejecting our null hypothesis have no mathematical or empirical relevance, 
they are arbitrary thresholds.  There can and should be no universal standard.  Each case must be 
judged on its merits.  Significance tests are based on unrealistic assumptions giving them limited 
applicability in practice.  They relate only to the assessment of the role of chance and they are not 
very informative at that if at all.  They tell us nothing about the impact of errors, and do not help 
decide whether any plausible substantive result is true.  First and foremost, there are no magical 
solutions besides informed human judgment.  Like the current debate on field normalization, it is 
time to start a debate concerning the (mis)use of statistical significance testing within our field.  We 
encourage quantitative and statistical thinking, not mindless statistics.  We do not think that the null 
ritual has much if anything that speaks for it. 
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